Saturday, June 21, 2008

Philip Conisbee; National Gallery Curator



Philip Conisbee; National Gallery Curator

By Matt Schudel
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, January 19, 2008; B05

Philip Conisbee, a National Gallery of Art curator who organized several of the museum's most popular and acclaimed exhibitions of recent years, died Jan. 16 of complications of lung cancer at his home in Washington. He was 62.

A onetime college professor in his native United Kingdom, Mr. Conisbee possessed a refined curatorial eye and a gift for explaining art to the general public. He was a guiding force behind many successful exhibitions at the National Gallery, including ones devoted to the works of Vincent van Gogh, Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec and Paul C¿zanne.

Mr. Conisbee specialized in French and other European art from the 17th to the 19th century and joined the National Gallery in 1993 as curator of French paintings. He had been the museum's senior curator of European paintings since 1998.

Perhaps his most resounding success came in late 1998, when he was co-curator of "Van Gogh's Van Goghs," an exhibition of 70 masterpieces from the Van Gogh Museum in the Netherlands. More than 480,000 visitors attended the exhibition, which ran for 90 days. Lines stretched around the block as art lovers arrived as early as 4 a.m. to claim their places. Admission was free, but tickets were scalped for as much as $100.

"It's a phenomenal thing," National Gallery Director Earl A. Powell III said at the time. "It's a benchmark against which other things will be measured."

Mr. Conisbee supervised the installation of the paintings, which had seldom been shown outside the Netherlands, down to the smallest detail. Each painting was measured so that its center was exactly 62 inches above the floor.

The exhibition later traveled to Los Angeles, where it was seen by more than 900,000 people.

In 2006, Mr. Conisbee was co-curator of another National Gallery blockbuster, "C¿zanne in Provence," seen by more than 335,000 people. Mr. Conisbee wrote the principal essay for the exhibition catalogue, which examined the 19th-century artist's life and work.

Earlier, in a 1998 article in The Washington Post, Mr. Conisbee had described the French master's "Boy in a Red Waistcoat" (1890) as "my favorite among the 20 C¿zannes" in the National Gallery.

"If you look at how C¿zanne combines these colors with his very free brushwork," he said, "you'll understand that this is a pivotal picture in the history of art. It was done right at the transition from representational painting to modern abstract painting."

When Mr. Conisbee came to the National Gallery from the Los Angeles County Museum of Art in 1993, New York art dealer Richard L. Feigen told the Los Angeles Times: "There aren't many Philip Conisbees around. He is one of the great curatorial talents in the world."

Philip Conisbee was born Jan. 3, 1946, in Belfast and grew up primarily in London. He graduated from the University of London's Courtauld Institute of Art in 1968 and received a doctorate in art history from the Courtauld in 1978. (He rarely used the title of "Dr.", preferring to be known as "Mr.")

He taught at the University of Reading, the University of London and, for 12 years, at the University of Leicester in England. From 1978 to 1986, he presented an annual seminar on 18th- and 19th-century French art at the University of Cambridge.

He came to the United States in 1986 as an associate curator of French paintings at Boston's Museum of Fine Arts, then went to the Los Angeles County museum in 1988 as curator of European painting and sculpture. His boss in Los Angeles, Powell, later hired him at the National Gallery.

Among other prominent exhibitions that Mr. Conisbee helped curate at the National Gallery were "In the Light of Italy" (1996), featuring French painter Jean-Baptiste-Camille Corot; "Georges de La Tour and His World" (1996); "Degas at the Races" (1998); "Manet, Monet, and the Gare Saint-Lazare" (1998); "Portraits by Ingres" (1999); and "Toulouse-Lautrec and Montmartre" (2004).

Mr. Conisbee once described his joy at opening crates of newly arrived art before an exhibition: "One of the most exciting parts of a curator's life is to see the paintings coming out of their packages. It's like Christmastime."

He wrote and lectured on art history and museum work and collected European paintings and prints. He became a U.S. citizen in 1994.

Mr. Conisbee, who had a cultivated British accent, a mane of silver hair and a commanding 6-foot-3 presence, was a favorite of reporters and often appeared on television and radio. He always maintained a sense of humor about his work and delighted in a story about overhearing two matrons discussing French artists of the 19th century.

"Manet, Monet," one of them said. "Either is correct."

His marriage to Susan Baer ended in divorce.

Survivors include his wife of 14 years, Faya Causey Conisbee of Washington, who is the National Gallery's head of academic programs; two children from his first marriage, Ben Conisbee Baer of New York and Molly Conisbee-Rijke of Bath, England; a stepson, Jan Causey Frel of San Francisco; his father, Paul Conisbee of London; and a brother.

Wednesday, June 11, 2008

Pakistan May Turn Over U.S. Spies to Iran

Pakistan May Turn Over U.S. 'Spies' to Iran

Iran Claims Jundullah Militants, Led by Abdel Malik Regi, Are 'Spies' for the CIA

By RICHARD ESPOSITO and BRIAN ROSS

May 23, 2008—

In another sign of growing tensions with the United States, Pakistan is threatening to turn over to Iran six members of a tribal militant group Iran claims are "spies" for the CIA.

The group, Jundullah, operates in Baluchistan on both sides of the border between Iran and Pakistan and has carried out a number of violent attacks on Iranian army facilities and officers inside the country.

The CIA has denied any direct ties with the group, but U.S. officials tell ABC News U.S. intelligence officers frequently meet and advise Jundullah leaders, and current and former intelligence officers are working to prevent the men from being sent to Iran.

The six Jundullah members were taken into custody by Pakistani authorities last week, and the Iranian Mehr News Agency reported Pakistan would soon extradite the men to Iran, where they would likely be put on trial as spies and face execution.

Officials said the group's leader, Abdel Malik Regi, was not among those arrested by Pakistan.

U.S. intelligence officials say they are aware of the developments with the Jundullah members and are said to be trying to block the extradition. In addition to causing turmoil in Iran, the officials say the group has been helpful in tracking al Qaeda figures trying to move through the Baluchistan region to Iran.

"The new Pakistan leaders have said they are going to do it, but they are saying a lot of things and trying to make a lot of deals," said one U.S. official. "If they are seeking stability inside the country, why would they want to inflame people in this region?" the official asked.

Iranian officials claimed this week that the U.S. had "a hand" in an April 12 bomb attack at a mosque in Shiraz that killed 14 people, according to Mehr News Agency, quoting Iranian Intelligence Minister Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei.

"The U.S. is behind many events in Iran and the region with the aim of bringing insecurity," the intelligence minister reportedly said. "We have proper documentations in this regard," the minister told the news agency's reporters.

A senior U.S. official said Iran's claims "are nonsense, ludicrous."

The capture of the Jundullah members is seen by intelligence sources in the region as another indication that Pakistan's new government is distancing itself from the U.S. and U.S. intelligence operations in the country.

Other such steps by Pakistan in recent days include an accord between Pakistan's government and militant tribal leaders in the country's Swat Valley region where Taliban figures are believed to be hiding. Increasingly, U.S. sources say, Pakistan is effectively handcuffing U.S. ground efforts against al Qaeda in the border region and emboldening the Taliban.

Click Here for the Investigative Homepage.

Israeli/Mossad Spying in and on the US

The Spy Who Loves Us: Pay no mind to the Mossad agent on the line

Philip Giraldi

The American Conservative

After Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard was sentenced to life in prison in 1986, the U.S. negotiated an understanding with Israel—a “gentlemen’s agreement” —stipulating that neither nation would thenceforth conduct espionage operations in the other’s territory without consent. But the agreement was a sham from the beginning. The Israeli government didn’t even honor its commitments in the aftermath of the Pollard case, failing to return the estimated 360 cubic feet of stolen information to enable the U.S. to conduct a damage assessment.

The United States, for its part, continued to recruit and run agents inside Israel throughout the 1980s and 1990s. And it was known within the intelligence and counterintelligence communities that Israel did the same in the United States. David Szady, the FBI’s assistant director for counterintelligence, was so dismayed by the level of Israeli spying in the late ’90s that he called in the head of the Israeli Embassy’s Central Institute for Intelligence and Special Activities (Mossad) office and told him, “Knock it off.”

Pollard’s name was in the news again on April 22, when former U.S. Army weapons engineer Ben-Ami Kadish was arrested for passing secrets to Israel. Kadish had been an agent run by Yosef Yagur, who directed Pollard. Yagur, under cover as a science attaché at the Israeli Consulate General in New York, fled the U.S. in 1985 after Pollard was arrested, but remained in touch with Kadish.

The arrest revived suspicions that Israeli agents might still be operating inside the U.S., most particularly “Mega,” whose cover name was revealed in an NSA-intercepted conversation between two Israeli intelligence officers. “Mega” was clearly at the policymaker level, as Kadish and Pollard frequently sought files by name or number. Someone more senior in Washington appeared to be directing the Israeli handlers toward sensitive information. Whoever “Mega” was, he is still at large.

Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Arieh Mekel sought to play down the allegations, noting, “Since 1985 there have been clear orders from prime ministers not to conduct these kinds of activities.” The media obediently reported the disclaimer under headlines such as Agence France Presse’s: “Israel says no spying on US since 1985.” But the spokesman had not said that. He referred to “these kinds of activities,” possibly meaning the recruitment of American Jews to work as Israeli intelligence agents. Mekel’s half-hearted denial was a step removed from the Israeli government’s reaction to the 2004 investigation of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, when then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev insisted that Israel “does not spy on the United States of America.”

It’s possible that Israel has largely demurred from recruiting American Jews as spies, but Tel Aviv’s intelligence operations in the U.S. have undeniably continued. The magnitude of Israeli espionage is certainly known to some senior government officials and is hidden in classified files. But even evidence available in public records attests to widespread infiltration.

Spy operations run by a case officer directly involving a controlled agent are only one of many tasks delegated to an intelligence service. Other responsibilities might include tapping into communications networks, directing agents of influence in the foreign government who can enable favorable policy decisions, running covert actions that feed misleading information to the media, and arranging technology transfers that frequently rely on companies that are either fronts or co-operating with the intelligence service to obtain secret military or commercial information. Even if Israel has stopped recruiting American Jews—and that is by no means certain—it nevertheless continues to carry out many core intelligence operations in the United States.

Israel has little need to run agents of influence here as its intelligence officers, diplomats, and politicians already have unfettered access to policymakers. It has been reported that the Pentagon under Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith—both of whom have been investigated for passing classified information to Israel—took few steps to monitor Israeli visitors. Likewise, the Israeli Embassy has excellent access to the media. When it wants to plant propaganda or place stories intended to shape opinion in a direction favorable to Israel, the Mossad generally looks to the British press. Rupert Murdoch’s Times group of newspapers and the Daily Telegraph, formerly owned by Conrad Black, have featured many articles that clearly originated with Israeli government sources. Such pieces are often picked up and replayed in the United States.

Virtually every U.S. government body concerned with security has confirmed that Israeli espionage takes place, though it is frequently not exposed because FBI officers know that investigating these crimes is frustrating and does no favors for their careers. But Israel always features prominently in the annual FBI report called “Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage.” The 2005 report states, “Israel has an active program to gather proprietary information within the United States. These collection activities are primarily directed at obtaining information on military systems and advanced computing applications that can be used in Israel’s sizable armaments industry.” It adds that Israel recruits spies, uses electronic methods, and carries out computer intrusion to gain the information.

The focus on U.S. military secrets is not limited to information needed for the defense of Israel, as was argued when Pollard was arrested. Some of the information he stole was of such value that many high-ranking intelligence officers believe the Soviet Union agreed to the release of tens of thousands of Russian Jews for resettlement in Israel in exchange. In early 1996, the Office of Naval Investigations concluded that Israel had transferred sensitive military technology to China. In 2000, the Israeli government attempted to sell China the sophisticated Phalcon early warning aircraft, which was based on U.S.-licensed technology. A 2005 FBI report noted that the thefts eroded U.S. military advantage, enabling foreign powers to obtain hugely expensive technologies that had taken years to develop.

In 1996, ten years after the agreement that concluded the Pollard affair, the Pentagon’s Defense Investigative Service warned defense contractors that Israel had “espionage intentions and capabilities” here and was aggressively trying to steal military and intelligence secrets. It also cited a security threat posed by individuals who have “strong ethnic ties” to Israel, stating that “Placing Israeli nationals in key industries … is a technique utilized with great success.” The memo cited illegal transfer of proprietary information from an Illinois optics firm in 1986, after the Pollard arrest, as well as the theft of test equipment for a radar system in the mid-1980s. A storm of outrage from the Anti-Defamation League led to the Pentagon’s withdrawal of the memo, an apology that predictably blamed the language on “a low-ranking individual,” and a promise that no similar warning would be written again.

But the issue of Israeli spying would not go away. Soon after, the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, completed an examination of espionage directed against American defense and security industries. The report described how Israeli citizens residing in the U.S. had stolen sensitive technology to manufacture artillery gun tubes, obtained classified plans for a reconnaissance system, and passed sensitive aerospace designs to unauthorized users. An Israeli company was caught monitoring a Department of Defense telecommunications system to obtain classified information, while other Israeli entities targeted avionics, missile telemetry, aircraft communications, software systems, and advanced materials and coatings used in missile re-entry. Independently, a Defense Department source confirmed the GAO report, citing “dozens of other spy cases within the U.S. Defense industry.” The GAO concluded that Israel “conducts the most aggressive espionage operation against the United States of any U.S. ally.”

In early 2001, several federal government agencies noticed a series of intrusive approaches by Israelis who were ostensibly selling paintings. In June, the Drug Enforcement Administration made a compilation of the activities of the so-called “art students” in a classified report, which was later leaked. The report documents 125 specific attempts by Israelis to gain entry to government offices, residences of government employees, and even Defense Department facilities between January and June 2001. The Israelis “targeted and penetrated military bases” and were observed trying to enter federal buildings from back doors and parking garages. One detained Israeli was caught wandering around the federal building in Dallas with a detailed floor plan in hand. Many of those arrested were found to have backgrounds in “military intelligence, electronic surveillance intercept, or explosive ordnance units.”

Now, there may have been an Israeli student subculture in the U.S. selling cheap reproductions. But it is also clear that the art-student mechanism was used by intelligence officers to provide cover for espionage. The students were organized in cells of eight to ten members that traveled in vans, which provide concealment for electronic equipment. Several of the students were able to afford expensive airline tickets to hop from plane to plane, two of them flying in one day from Hamburg to Miami, then to Chicago, and finally winding up in Toronto on tickets that cost $15,000 each. In Miami and Chicago, they visited two government officials to try to sell their art. Another student had in his possession deposit slips for $180,000. Six students used cellphones provided by a former Israeli vice consul. Many claimed to be registered at either the University of Jerusalem or the Bezalel Academy of Arts in Jerusalem, but not a single name could be connected to the student body list of Bezalel, and there is no University of Jerusalem.

It is plausible that the art students who were actually intelligence officers might have been seeking entry to DEA facilities to gain access to confidential databases. If the broader Israeli espionage effort was focused on Arabs in the United States, such information would be invaluable. The DEA report concluded cautiously that the Israelis “might well be engaged in organized intelligence gathering.” Of the 140 art students arrested, most were deported for immigration violations. Some were just let go.

And then there are the movers. Urban Moving Systems of Weehawken, New Jersey was largely staffed by Israelis, many of whom had recently been discharged from the Israeli Defense Forces. As has been widely reported, three movers were photographed celebrating in Liberty State Park against the backdrop of the first collapsing World Trade Center tower. The celebration came 16 minutes after the first plane struck, when no one knew that there had been a terrorist attack and the episode was assumed to be a horrible accident. The owner of the moving company, Dominik Suter, was questioned once by the FBI before fleeing to Israel. He has since refused to answer questions.

Whether the movers and the art students had jointly pieced together enough information to provide a preview of 9/11 remains hidden in intelligence files in Tel Aviv, but the proximity of both groups to 15 of the hijackers in Hollywood, Florida and to five others in northern New Jersey is suggestive.

Speculation about 9/11 aside, it is certain that Urban Moving was involved in an intelligence-collection operation against Arabs living in the United States, possibly involving electronic surveillance of phone calls and other communications. When they were arrested, the five Israelis working for Urban Moving had multiple passports and nearly $5,000 in cash. They were held for 71 days, failed a number of polygraph exams, and were finally allowed to return to Israel after Tel Aviv admitted that they were Mossad and apologized.

Between 55 and 95 other Israelis were also arrested in the weeks following 9/11, and a number were reported to be active-duty military personnel. The FBI came under intense pressure from several congressmen and various pro-Israel groups to release the detainees. The order to free them came from Judge Michael Mukasey, now the U.S. attorney general. An FBI investigator noted, “Leads were not fully investigated” due to pressure from “higher echelons.” According to one source, the White House may have made the final decision to terminate the inquiry. Though the investigation could have gone much farther, the FBI identified two of the Weehawken movers as Israeli intelligence officers and confirmed that Urban Moving was a front for Mossad to “spy on local Arabs.” One CIA officer involved in the investigation concluded, “The Israelis likely had a huge spy operation.”

In May 2004, there were two incidents involving Israelis in moving vans in proximity to U.S. nuclear facilities. One occurred in Tennessee near the Nuclear Fuel Services plant, which reprocesses nuclear waste from hospitals. The van was pursued by the local sheriff for three miles after refusing to pull over. The two fleeing Israelis, who threw a bottle containing an accelerant, had in their possession Israeli military ID’s and false U.S. documents. In the second incident, two movers in a van tried to enter the Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base in Georgia, which is home to eight Trident nuclear submarines, but were arrested when dogs detected drugs inside their vehicle. The men had military ID’s and false documents. There was no follow-up by the FBI even though both incidents were reported to federal authorities.

There have also been reports of intensive targeting of U.S. government facilities overseas. In late 2001, State Department security noted a series of incidents at diplomatic missions and military bases, all involving Israelis. It described many of the incidents as “bizarre.” In one instance, French police arrested several Israelis at 2 a.m. after they were observed taking numerous photos of the U.S. embassy in Paris. As it was dark, their behavior was unusual to say the least—or perhaps not since it was revealed that the Israelis were using infrared film to detect communications equipment in the embassy.

In August 2004, the media discovered an FBI investigation, begun in 1999, involving Pentagon intelligence analyst Larry Franklin. He had openly met Israeli Embassy intelligence officer Naor Gilon as well as two AIPAC officials, director Steve Rosen and chief analyst Keith Weissman. He pleaded guilty in October 2005 to revealing classified information and is now serving a 12-year prison sentence. Rosen and Weissman are currently on trial. If the prosecution is correct, Franklin passed classified information relating to Iran to both AIPAC employees, who in turn provided the information to the Israeli Embassy. The defense has argued that such exchanges are routine in Washington, particularly between close allies such as Israel and the U.S., but that is a dubious reading of events. Passing classified information and documents is not the same as casual political conversation over a cup of coffee. If Israel had stopped spying on the United States, Gilon should have refused to receive the information provided by Franklin. He might even have gone through official channels to report Franklin’s activity. He did neither. Nor did Rosen and Weissman object when they received information that they knew to be classified. Instead, they passed it on to the Israelis.

In June 2006, it was revealed that the Pentagon had begun to deny security clearances to American Jews who had family in Israel. Israelis seeking security approval to work for American defense contractors were also finding it increasingly difficult to obtain clearances. A Pentagon administrative judge overruled an appeal by one of the Israelis, stating, “The Israeli government is actively engaged in military and industrial espionage in the United States. An Israeli citizen working in the US who has access to proprietary information is likely to be a target of such espionage.”

Israel conducts much of its high-tech spying through its corporate presence in the United States. It is heavily embedded in the telecommunications industry, which permits access to the exchange of information. The Whitewater investigation revealed that President Bill Clinton warned Monica Lewinsky that their phone-sex conversations might have been recorded by a foreign government. That foreign government would have been Israel, where government and business work hand-in-hand in the high-tech sector, and many former government officials and military officers hold senior management positions. The corporations, in return, receive large contracts with the Israeli government and the Israel Defense Forces.

Two Israeli companies in particular—Amdocs and Comverse Infosys, both of which are headquartered in Israel—do significant business in the United States. Amdocs, which has contracts with the 25 largest telephone companies in the U.S. that together handle 90 percent of all calls made, logs all calls that go out and come in on the system. It does not record the conversations themselves, but the records provide patterns, referred to as “traffic analysis,” that can provide intelligence leads. In 1999, the National Security Agency warned that records of calls made in the United States were winding up in Israel. Amdocs also has an apparent relationship with some of the art students who were arrested in 2001. Several were provided with bond money by an Amdocs executive.

Comverse Infosys provides wiretapping equipment to law enforcement throughout the United States and also has large contracts with the Israeli government, which reimburses up to 50 percent of the company’s research and development costs. Because equipment used to tap phones for law enforcement is integrated into the networks that phone companies operate, it cannot be detected. Phone calls are intercepted, recorded, stored, and transmitted to investigators by Comverse, which claims that it has to be “hands on” with its equipment to maintain the system. Many experts believe that it is relatively easy to create a so-called “back door” that permits the recording to be sent to a second party, unknown to the authorized law-enforcement recipient. And Comverse equipment has never been inspected by FBI or NSA experts to determine whether the information it collects can be leaked, reportedly because senior government managers block such inquiries.

According to a Fox News investigative report, which was later deleted from Fox’s website under pressure from various pro-Israel groups, DEA and FBI sources say that even to suggest that Israel might be spying using Comverse “is considered career suicide.”

A number of criminal investigations using Comverse equipment have apparently come to dead ends when the targets abruptly change their telecommunications methods, suggesting at a minimum that Comverse employees might be leaking sensitive information to Israeli organized crime.

The chickens occasionally come home to roost. In 2002, Israeli espionage might have been directed against the U.S. Congress, which has so assidiously ignored Tel Aviv’s spying. Congressman Bob Ney, currently in prison for corruption, arranged a noncompetitive bid for the Israeli telecommunications company Foxcom Wireless to install equipment to improve cellphone reception in the Capitol and House office buildings. Foxcom, based in Jerusalem, has been linked to imprisoned lobbyist Jack Abramoff. Telecommunications security experts note that equipment that can be used to enhance or improve a signal can also be used to redirect the phone conversation to another location for recording and analysis. The possibility that someone in the Israeli Embassy might be listening to congressmen’s private phone conversations is intriguing to say the least.

Some might argue that collecting intelligence is a function of government and that espionage, even between friends, will always take place. But the intensity and persistence of Israeli spying against the United States is particularly disturbing since Israel relies so heavily on American political and military support. Other allies like Britain, France, and Germany undoubtedly have spies in Washington, but there is a line that they do not cross.

Given the stakes involved, it would be reasonable for the United States to quietly offer Israel’s leaders a choice. They can continue to receive billions of dollars in aid, or they can persist in spying against their greatest benefactor. They should not be permitted to do both.

¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA Officer, is a fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance.

© 2008 Philip Giraldi

SOURCE: http://www.amconmag.com/2008/2008_06_02/images/magcoverlg.jpg

URL: http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/cgi-bin/blogs/voices.php/2008/06/11/the_spy_who_loves_us_pay_no_mind_to_the_

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Friday, June 6, 2008

American Zionist Operator Edward Luttwak

The Operator: The Double Life of a Military Strategist
Profile

A BYZANTINE STRATEGY: In his latest book, Luttwak will argue that, in crafting its Iraq strategy, America should look to Byzantium.
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There’s one thing Edward Luttwak wanted me to know, before he asked if I had a cell phone, and if so, could I turn it off and remove its battery, presumably if improbably so that he couldn’t be traced. We were sitting in his office library in his family’s sprawling Victorian home in suburban Chevy Chase, Md., full of books from floor to ceiling in Greek, Latin and from the modern era, volumes by Clausewitz, Walter Lacquer, Theodore Draper’s account of Iran Contra and thousands of others. These included a recent U.S. Military Balance survey, cataloguing the F-14s, F-7s, Phantoms and every other significant piece of military anti-air equipment estimated to be held by Iran — statistics that Luttwak looked up and ticked off during the course of our interview.

“I am an operator,” Luttwak said.

Indeed he is, one who carries out field operations, extraditions, arrests, interrogations (never, he insists, using physical violence), military consulting and counterterrorism training for different agencies of the U.S., foreign governments and private interests. When we met, in February, the Drug Enforcement Agency was his latest client; Luttwak says he went to Colombia to help arrest and deliver a couple of Mexican drug runners wanted by the DEA.

Luttwak is of course better known as a public intellectual, the author of some 16 books, as well as a forthcoming study on warfare in Byzantium, set to be published next year by Harvard University Press. “We will never be the Roman empire,” Luttwak said, summarizing his thesis. “Bush, the genius, if he’s lucky, will create a situation as in Byzantium, where the different enemies fight each other.” In fact, his two identities have always been intertwined: On a first name basis with the heads of Italian and other foreign government security agencies, Luttwak performs such quasi paramilitary operations — under the vague title of “consultant” — while maintaining a public image as a military historian, thinker and writer, if a frequently (and deliberately) controversial one.

Why is this 65-year-old intellectual — on the editorial boards of Harper’s, Britain’s Prospect and France’s Geopolitique, an emeritus fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies — still in the business of arresting fugitives and interrogating drug dealers, I asked Luttwak. It was evident he didn’t even believe in some of the missions he was doing (the drug war is futile, he howled, a fraud, and the heads of the DEA know it’s a fraud). Is it a thrill? Luttwak admitted, that yes, it’s thrilling. He enjoys the physical thrill of it all.

Born to a wealthy Jewish family in Arad, in Transylvanian Romania, in 1942 during World War II, Luttwak and his family fled soon after to Italy, where his father started one of the first Italian plastics factories. At the age of 9, he was sent off by his family to a Jewish boarding school in London, where he would later attend the London School of Economics. Given his background — part cosmopolitan, part refugee — from all over Europe, it’s no surprise that Luttwak speaks a half dozen languages fluently and with evident pleasure (his phone message at home is in three languages). He still travels frequently to Europe, South America and Asia for his consulting assignments. In addition to their Maryland home, Luttwak and his wife, sculptor Dalya Luttwak, also own an ecologically friendly cattle ranch in Bolivia. (Luttwak, who told me he conducts his family’s Passover Seder in the ancient Aramaic, says he doesn’t consider himself religious, but enjoys the traditions.)

Luttwak’s career as an international defense consultant, military strategist and operator, was launched when, in 1968, as a 26-year-old graduate of the London School of Economics, he wrote what would become his seminal book, “Coup d’etat: A Practical Handbook,” about how countries and groups can both launch a junta and protect themselves from one, and which, Luttwak noted proudly, is still in print some 40 years later. “This short book is…wicked, truthful, and entertaining,” the New Yorker wrote in its review of “Coup,” which has been printed in 14 languages. Recruited to Johns Hopkins after advising the French, Israeli and other governments on military matters, Luttwak earned a PhD in international relations and started consulting for the U.S. Department of Defense, military services, the National Security Council, State Department and nascent U.S. special operations command. Soon he was doing actions for, among others, the undersecretary of defense for policy in El Salvador.

Luttwak first came to my attention by way of an obscure detail in incorporation papers I had retrieved from a government registrar a few years ago, that named him as an officer in a small private consulting company, I.S.I. Enterprises, Inc., headed by Michael Ledeen, the neoconservative historian and writer who had a key role in the Iran Contra affair and who more recently engineered meetings during the Bush administration between Pentagon officials and controversial arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar.

Luttwak said that he and Ledeen, both fluent Italian speakers who served as consultants to the Reagan administration, are still friends, but that he left their joint international consulting business soon after it was formed, after completing assignments for the security services of Italy and Spain. (After he left, according to Luttwak, Ledeen went on to do lobbying and consulting through the business in Africa.) Luttwak said that he doesn’t do the kind of more political covert action that his friend Ledeen favors.

“Michael is much more of an adventurer in political action than I was,” Luttwak explained. “I like my adventures in nature.”

Luttwak expounds on his insistence on scrupulously upholding the letter of the law “to the last millimeter” in whatever country in which he is currently operating, mentioning that he once turned down an Iran-Contra assignment in Central America when, on a hunch, he checked with then-House Intelligence Committee minority leader Dick Cheney if the tasking order was indeed authorized by a presidential finding and Congress notified of its existence.According to Luttwak, Cheney called him back after checking and told him no.

Many of these past associations emerged in a recent episode revealed during my meeting with Luttwak: that he was shown the infamous Niger forgeries by a friend with the Italian intelligence agency Sismi, when he was working as a consultant to a Sismi contractor named Luciano Monti in the 2001-2002 time frame, but that he refused to back-channel them to the Bush administration. (He never agrees to back-channel intelligence, Luttwak said, and these looked like forgeries to him.) The allegations in the forgeries, of course, became one of the Bush White House’s most controversial casus belli for the Iraq war — and, after proven phony even on the eve of the invasion, among the most embarrassing and politically damaging for the president and vice president, who cited the bogus uranium allegations despite warnings from the CIA not to.

There are a few public glimpses of intriguing episodes of covert military operations in Luttwak’s past. One was recounted in the book “Charlie Wilson’s War,” by the late Harper’s editor and “60 minutes” producer George Criles, recently made into a movie, which described Luttwak advising Wilson on what non American anti-aircraft weapons the CIA could covertly supply to the Afghan mujahadeen. According to Criles, Luttwak recommended the Swiss Oerlikon. Luttwak mentions his presence in “Charlie Wilson’s War” as being one of the few public descriptions of him — at first glance, a somewhat absurd statement, for the author of more than a dozen published books. But perhaps what Luttwak really means is that “Charlie Wilson’s War” is one of the few public works that reveal his non-academic, operational side.

Another revealing Cold War episode in Luttwak’s more covert professional history, recounted by Penn State University criminal justice professor Alan Block in an academic text, describes Luttwak working as an arms consultant and CIA go-between for an unusual client: a right-wing operative, Miami radio talk show host and former beauty queen Barbara Studley, president of an outfit called GeoMiliTech Consultants Corporation, whose Cold War-era arms sales involving Iran, South Korea, Israel and Central America foreshadowed the Iran Contra operation. According to Block, “GeoMiliTech presented [then CIA director] Bill Casey its ultimate plan — a coordinated series of weapons deals worth $80 million, many of them barter arrangements with Israel, all of them worked through a secret Swiss bank, the whole package guaranteed to evade the ‘consent or awareness of the Department of State or Congress.’ The program was hand-delivered to Casey by Edward N. Luttwak, now a distinguished author and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington.”

When, prompted by the trinkets from the South Korean government circa 1980 and 1981 decorating his book shelf, I asked Luttwak about Studley, he at first said he did not recall who that is — using the classic phrasing a lawyer might prompt a client to use in testimony to evade answering untruthfully while not really answering. When I asked him if he knew another of the arms dealers involved in the early Iran arms sales, Arif Durrani, he said far more definitively, “Absolutely not.”

But some 25 years later, covert Iran intrigues and operations were again on Luttwak’s mind when he spoke with me this year. Speaking at a panel held at the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank, in February, Luttwak hinted at post-Revolutionary travels in Iran. “I recommend that you take a trip to Iran,” Luttwak mischievously suggested to audience members. “Isfahan is beautiful, as is Tabriz in the north, where the people crave to be Turks,” he said, before describing being offered whiskey — the good stuff — by locals he met, a sign of their defiance to the mullahs.

Luttwak told me he had traveled to Turkey on a prospective assignment a couple years ago that involved advising Azeri Iranians how they might agitate for more independence from the Tehran regime. He walked away from the assignment, he described, when it became evident to him that the operation was not, as he had originally thought, authorized by the necessary governments.

But in April, Luttwak told me, he was off to Paris to meet with another Iranian group seeking his consulting services. “My client is an anti-Iran group,” Luttwak said. “They are serious enough to have come up with funds to hire consultants.” He wouldn’t reveal which group it was, except to say it was authorized to operate in France.

Luttwak has said in numerous interviews and public appearances that he believes someone should act to destabilize the Iranian regime by arming and supporting its various disgruntled ethnic minority groups — the Kurds, the Goranis (“who are Kurds but don’t know it,” he told the Hudson audience), Azeris (who consider themselves Turks, Luttwak said), Baluch, Khuzestanis — to rise up against the against the Tehran regime. Iran is the last multinational country in the region, Luttwak told the Hudson Institute, and its fate, like other multinational empires, is to break up.

Iran is also central to Luttwak’s thinking about America’s own political landscape and the current presidential race. When we met in February, a day after Maryland’s Democratic primary, Luttwak said that he was supporting Hillary Clinton because he thought she would be most inclined to order air strikes on Iran. Contrary to conventional wisdom, as always, Luttwak said that direct conversations he had had with a certain leading Republican presidential candidate convinced him that this person, under the influence of war-weary Pentagon brass, would be disinclined to order such military action. As for his opinion about presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama, Luttwak took a preemptive swipe at the candidate’s elite American supporters who might be under the delusion, according to Luttwak, that Obama would improve America’s image in the world, arguing in a May 13 New York Times op-ed the exact opposite: that the Muslim world would see Obama as a heretic. The Times’s public editor devoted his entire June 1 column to debunking the allegations Luttwak cited in the piece and criticizing the Times’s editors’ decision to run it.

Among the trinkets crowding his library shelves — awards and mementoes from the foreign governments he had advised on coups and counter-coups and terrorism and military strategy — stands a small black and white photo of a young Luttwak, in short pants, a white shirt and suspenders, with his two brothers similarly dressed, the boys from about 6 to 9 years old, his dark-haired mother and father and another man in the style of the late 1940s Europe. I picked up the photo, melded into a metal frame, and asked Luttwak about it. The photo was of his family in Palermo Italy, he said, not at all wistfully, those are his brothers, one now lives in Israel, the other in Nigeria. The darker man with his parents: his “father’s sidekick,” Luttwak said. He looked to be about 8 years old, and World War II was just a few years behind.

Upon my earlier visit, I noticed a gorgeous Ottoman wall hanging in the foyer, and he told me it was from his family’s home in Romania, and how he’d gone, armed, during the height of the Cold War to the family then living in his old family’s home, and told them there would be no problems if they allowed him to go retrieve something that belongs to him, stored under the stairs when his family fled. They let him in, and, he says, he took it.

Before Luttwak asked me to take the cell phone battery out of my phone in our February meeting, I offered him another theory about himself, given his experience as a refugee from the Nazis and the Communists, who taught himself to be not only smarter than his many enemies but constantly tested and prepared for military battle, a one-man intelligence agency and Pentagon, only more single-minded and ruthlessly efficient when necessary: that he is a Jewish survivalist, albeit one with a PhD, a dozen published books, as many languages, and a highly evolved if eccentric sense of personal morality.

He pondered this, and said he doesn’t recognize himself in that description. “I value Jewish culture and traditions, my parents did too, but I am not a believer.” What is there not to believe in, I asked. Luttwak doesn’t believe in a transcendental force, he said, sounding perhaps a rare note of uncertainty. All these human events, the warfare and survival he has written so much about, it seems, are left only to man.

Laura Rozen reports from Washington, D.C., as national security correspondent for Mother Jones. She contributed the afterword to the memoir of former CIA official Valerie Plame Wilson, “Fair Game: My Life as a Spy, My Betrayal by the White House” (Simon & Schuster, 2007).